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A. Introduction
Let me start by assuming that we all have reached the same answer to the open
question of whether it is desirable to harmonise or even unify family law. That
we all agree that the answer is yes. And that we further agree that this ambitious
endeavour is feasible.' But even if we do come this far, our problems are not
over. Indeed, it is here that I want to begin today: what methodological
problems will we face as we start harmonising (or even unifying) family law?
'Methodos', the Greek notion, means 'the way to something', the systematic
procedure to reach a certain goal. Thus, my analysis will be extremely practical.
So let me take you on an adventurous journey of unifying family law, and let us
see what pitfalls await us along the path.
B. Starting Point: The Comparative Method
I am convinced that comparative law must be our starting point.' But the
comparative method has come under attack in recent years. Postmodernists
* This article was published previously in K. Boele-Woelki (Ed.). Perspectives for the
Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, European Family Law series No. 4,
143-158 (2003) and is reprinted with minor editorial modifications with kind permission of the
publisher Intersentia-Antwerp. The author is Professor of Private Law. University of Basel Law
School. The author is grateful to Professor Dr. h.c. Carol Bruch (University of California, Davis,
US) for a critical reading of the manuscript as well as to lic. iur. Michelle Cottier MA (Basel) for
her valuable research assistance.
1 The more recent literature is predominantly optimistic, see M.V.Antokolskaia, Would the
Harmonisation of Family Law Enlarge the Gap between the Law in the Books and the Law in
Action?. 2002 Die Praxis des Familienrechts (FamPra.ch) 261-292; K. Boele-Woelki, The Road
Towards a European Family Law, I Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (1997); D. Martiny,
Is Unification of Family Law Feasible or Even Desirable?, in A. Hartkamp et al. (Eds.), Towards
a European Civil Code 151-171 (1998): W. Pintens & K. Vanwinckelen, Casebook European
Family Law 15 (2001); W. Pintens, Rechtsvereinheitlichung und Rechtsangleichung im
Familienrecht. Eine Rolle fir die Europdische Union?, 6 Zeitschrift f(r Europdiisches Privatrecht
670-676 (1998): A. Rieg, L' harmonisation europdenne du droit de lafamille: mythe ou rdalit ?,
in W. Stoffel & P. Volken (Eds.), Conflits et harmonisation, Liber amicorum Alfred E. von
Overbeck 473-499 (1990).
2 See also Boele-Woelki, supra note 1. at 7.
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blame comparative law for being trapped in cultural frameworks,3 for being
extremely conservative4 and for not adequately considering the non-legal
framework within which society functions.5 Although there is quite a bit of truth
in this critique, abandoning comparative law altogether would mean throwing
the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, especially in family law, we can bene-
fit from these insights by always keeping value questions in mind and by
enriching the comparative method with an interdisciplinary approach. I will
come back to this suggestion later.
C. Law In Books - Law In Action
It goes without saying that the comparative method cannot confine itself to the
law as it is found in books but must also reveal the law as it appears in action.6
Indeed, in this respect, family law is similar to the law of obligations, the
century-old domain of comparative law.7
Still, let me give some examples drawn from family law to demonstrate the
practical importance of this principle.
As we all know, in most national statutes the notion of fault has lost its
importance as a ground for divorce.8 In some countries, however, it still plays a
role when it comes to the consequences of divorce, especially regarding post-
divorce spousal support. 9 Let us take, for example, Germany on the one hand
and England on the other. According to § 1579 No. 6 of the German BGB, post-
divorce spousal support can be reduced or even denied if there has been
manifestly gross, one-sided misconduct on the part of the spouse seeking
support. In England, pursuant to Sec. 25 (2) (g) of the MCA, l  the conduct of
the parties, that is fault, is one of several factors that the court must take into
' See A. Peters & H. Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism, 49 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 800. at 802 (2000). For an example of the opening of comparative
law to the 'global perspective', see I. Edge, (Ed.), Comparative Law in Global Perspective (2000).
' E.g. R. Michaels, Im Westen nichts ANeues?, 100 Jahre Pariser Kongress fir
Rechtsvergleichung Gedanken anlisslich einer Jubildiumskonferenz in New Orleans. 66 Rabels
Zeitschrift fWr auslfindisches und internationales Privatrecht 97, at 109 (2002).
' E.g. P. Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 60 et seq. (1996).
6 Boele-Woelki, supra note 1.
7 First studies in comparative family law have been published from the 1960s on, see W. MUller-
Freienfels, Ehe und Recht (1962). P.H. Neuhaus, Europaisches Familienrecht?: Gedanken zur
Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung, in E. von Caemmerer et al. (Eds.), Vom
deutschen zum europfiischen Recht: Festschrift ftr Hans Dolle, Vol. 2, 419-435 (1963); M.
Rheinstein. Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972). The International Society of Family
Law has been founded as late as in 1973. Concerning the history of comparative law see K.
Zweigert & H. Kotz, EinftAhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung I et seq. (1996).
See B. Dutoit et al., Le divorce en droit compar6, Vol. 1: Europe (2000).
9 See R. Hinderling, Verschulden und nachehelicher Ehegattenunterhalt: eine rechtsver-
gleichende Untersuchung zum schweizerischen, US-amerikanischen und deutschen Recht (2001).
'0 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
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account when deciding upon the financial consequences of divorce. Taken these
provisions at face value, one would suppose, that the German courts would
consider fault much less frequently than the English courts. But as early as in
1973 the English Court of Appeal11 decided that a reduction or even denial of a
financial provision should only be thought of in case of obvious and gross mis-
conduct - that is, if granting financial relief would be "repugnant to anyone's
sense of justice". This formula sounds pretty similar to the wording of the
German statute. Can one then suppose that an identical case will be decided
alike in the two countries? Not at all. Apparently judges in Germany and
England differ considerably in what they consider to be obvious and gross mis-
conduct. Thus there are many German court decisions discussing whether
adultery amounts to such misconduct, 2 whereas in England, as in many other
Anglo-American legal systems, it almost seems that nothing short of an
attempted murder of the obligor spouse will suffice.
13
One further difference is to be noted: in Germany "obvious and gross mis-
conduct" may only be invoked against the requesting spouse, i.e. in almost all
cases the wife, 14 whereas in England and other Anglo-American legal systems it
works both ways. It is possible to increase an award if the obligor's behaviour
amounted to obvious and gross misconduct, especially in cases of domestic
violence by the husband against the wife15 - cases that in general do not entail
any additional financial consequences under German law.
Only if one is aware of such discrepancies in interpretation can one usefully
discuss the relevance of fault in post-divorce spousal support.
Let me draw your attention to another feature of family law that illustrates
the differences between the law in books and the law in action: court decisions
reflect but a very small percentage of family law resolutions. Thus probably in
most countries 90 per cent of all divorce proceedings or even more end with a
separation or divorce agreement that resolves the financial issues. 16 It is these
agreements and not court decisions that determine the life of most divorcees,
" See Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] Fain. 72, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 366.
12 See H.U. Maurer. Commentary on §1579 No. 48, in Manchener Kommentar zum Borgerlichen
Gesetzbuch (2000).
13 England: see N. Lowe & G. Douglas, Bromley's Family Law 840 et seq. (1998).; United
States: see American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations, 84 et seq. (2002).
14 This amounts to an indirect or factual discrimination of women, see N. Dethloff, Reform of
German Family Law a Battle against Discrimination, 3 European Journal of Law Reform 221-
241 (2001).
15 England: Jones v. Jones (1976) Fain 8, (1975) 2 W.L.R. 606; Australia: see e.g. R. Bailey-
Harris, The Role of Maintenance and Property Orders in Redressing Inequality: Re-Opening the
Debate, 12 Australian Journal of Family Law 3, at 15 etseq. (1998).
16 In Norway, Denmark and Iceland, the spouses can choose in the case of an agreement the
procedure of administrative divorce, see S. Danielsen, The Scandinavian Approach:
Administrative and Judicial Resolutions of Family Conflicts, in M.-T. Meulders-Klein (Ed.),
Families & Justice 139, at 151 et seq. (1997); 1. Schwenzer, Registerscheidung?, in P. Gottwald,
E. Jayme, D. Schwab (Eds.). Festschrift flir Dieter Henrich 533, at 534 (2000).
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although of course they are bargained for in the shadow of the law. 17 If one
wants to get a clear picture of the consequences of divorce in a given country,
then, one has to examine the reality of such agreements and - going even a bit
further - the role of the professions involved in negotiating them.18
D. The Functional Approach
In family law as in the classical fields of comparative law, or even more so, the
starting point has to be the functional approach. 9 There is little sense in com-
paring institutions, but it is absolutely necessary to ask what the underlying
problem is that a certain legal provision is aimed to redress.
Let me give you one example, the question of pension splitting for husband
and wife at divorce, that is the equalisation of pension rights accrued during
marriage. Germany pioneered in these fields, expressly providing for pension
splitting as early as 1976.20 It was not until recently that other countries
followed suit, for example, the Netherlands in 1995,21 and England 22 and
Switzerland 23 in 2000. Still, even today, there are many legal systems that do
not split pensions at divorce, although they all face the same factual problem:
the wife who took care of the family and was not employed outside the home (at
least not full-time) and therefore accumulated less pension rights than her
husband, who worked full-time at higher pay. But focussing only on explicit
pension splitting rules would lead to a totally wrong impression. In many legal
systems the difference in spouses' pension rights is taken care of by property
distribution upon divorce. Pension rights accumulated during the ongoing
marriage are regarded as marital property and may thus be divided upon
divorce, be it equally or according to the discretion of the court.24 In still other
legal systems differences in accumulated pension rights have to be taken into
account in setting post-divorce spousal support awards.25 This leads us to the
conclusion that an overall understanding of how countries deal with the
inequality of spouses' work-related retirement accumulations can be achieved
only by considering all the economic consequences at divorce: explicit rules on
17 R. Mnookin & L. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
Yale Law Journal 950-997 (1979).
18 See e.g. B. Bastard & L. Cardia-Vonbche, Inter-Professional Tensions in the Divorce Process
in France, 9 International Journal of Law and the Family 275-285 (1995); J. Eekelaar, M.
Maclean, S. Beinart, Family Lawyers. The Divorce Work of Solicitors (2000).
19 See K. Zweigert & H. Kbtz, Einf~hrung in die Rechtsvergleichung 33 (1996).
20 §1587-1587p BGB.
2 Art. 94 para. 4. 155 BW.
22 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999.
23 Art. 122-124 CC.
24 E.g. in Sweden: Chapter 10, §3 para. 3 Marriage Act. United States: American Law Institute.
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (2002), §4.08
sec. I (a).
25 E.g. in France: Art. 272 CC.
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pension splitting, matrimonial property law in general, and spousal support, at
least.
Yet another family law example may be mentioned here. The possibility of
premarital contracts to regulate the economic consequences of divorce is
currently a hotly debated topic. 26 A country's treatment of the issue can be fully
understood only against the background of its matrimonial property and spousal
support regimes. Even if one finds that spouses are free to agree upon a regime
of separate property, it is possible that a country's courts may provide relief out-
side family law that circumvents the agreement, yet avoids any overt control of
its contents. Well known is, for example, the longstanding tradition of Anglo-
American courts, which make use of trust doctrines when family law does not
provide suitable remedy.27 In other countries fictitious employment contracts or
partnerships are popular tools to compensate wives who helped build up their
partners' businesses and find themselves without any legal title to the proceeds
when it comes to divorce.28
These examples may suffice to illustrate the functional comparative method
and how it applies in the field of family law.
E. Converging Tendencies
Once we have come this far and are able to analyse the underlying problematic
fact patterns and identify their solutions, however disguised they may be, we
will find quite a number of converging tendencies in European family law. 29 As
early as the 1970s a German author labelled this trend "Uniform Law Through
Evolution.' '30 Because these legal changes only reflect socio-demographic
developments in familial behaviour, let me recall the major changes that have
taken place in Western industrialised states during recent decades.
The most salient feature is the rise in the divorce rate. Since the 1970s, it has
more than doubled nearly everywhere.3 1 In many countries, the probability of
divorce has now reached 40 to 50 per cent. In Scandinavia, however, a certain
26 See M. Courvoisier, Voreheliche und eheliche Scheidungsfolgenvereinbarungen - Zuldissigkeit
und Gtiltigkeitsvoraussetzungen (2002); 1. Schwenzer, Richterliche Kontrolle von Unterhalts-
vereinbarungen zwischen Ehegatten. 5 Zeitschrift fMr Europdiisches Privatrecht 863-873 (1997).
27 See e.g. S.M. Cretney, Family Law 144 et seq. (2000).
28 See I. Schwenzer, Restitution of Benefits in Family Relationships, International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law. Vol. X: Restitution -Unjust Enrichment and Negotiorum Gestio, Chapter 12.
at 27 et seq. (1997).
29 The most prominent voice dismissing the convergence thesis is P. Legrand, European Systems
are not Converging, 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52-81 (1996).
30 G. Luther, Einheitsrecht durch Evolution im Eherecht und im Recht der ehedihnlichen
Gemeinschaf 45 Rabels Zeitschrift f[r auslindisches und internationales Privatrecht 253-267
(1981).
31 See Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, at T2.5 (1998); S.B.
Kamerman & A.J. Kahn, Family Change and Family Policies in Great Britain, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States (1997).
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stagnation at this high level has been observed since the 1980s, indicating that
the saturation point might now have been reached. The high number of divorces
brings about manifold further developments. These are, on one hand, the rapid
increase of children living in stepfamilies and, on the other, the growing number
of single-parent families. This is closely linked to the phenomenon described as
the feminisation of poverty.32 Indeed, studies of poverty have shown that in
many countries divorce constitutes a much higher risk factor for women than for
men 33 and that women living alone with children are especially touched by
poverty.34
Other features are the increase in age at first marriage and the general de-
crease in marriages. Taking the example of France, this means that today only
approximately 56 per cent of all women below the age of 50 have ever married,
compared to approximately 92 per cent of all women of this age group who had
married at least once in 1970. 35
Simultaneously, cohabitation has increased in all countries, in some places
dramatically indeed. In the Scandinavian countries, cohabitation can be con-
sidered an actual alternative to marriage, whereas in many other countries non-
marital unions are of shorter duration and frequently are formalised when
children are born.36
A general decline in fertility rates can also be observed. Since about 1965,
the reproduction rate of the population has fallen to a below-replacement level
in all developed countries.37 On the other hand, the number of out-of-wedlock
births has increased dramatically in recent decades. In some countries, namely
in Scandinavia, it has reached a level between 50 and 65 per cent.38
These demographic developments have nevertheless not occurred to the
same extent or at the same pace in all European countries. 39 Large differences
remain, with Scandinavian countries at one extreme and the Latin countries and
Ireland at the other.40
Family law could not and has not stayed unresponsive to these profound
socio-demographic changes. As Martiny once wrote: "[t]he basic issues [have
32 In the great majority of the states of the European Union, women are more at risk of poverty
than men, see Eurostat, The Life of Women and Men in Europe 99 (2002).
33 See for Switzerland: R.E. Leu, S. Burri, T. Priester, Lebensqualitfit und Armut in der Schweiz
(1997).
SIn most countries of the European Union, over 40% of all women living alone with a child had
an income below 60 % of the median in 1997, see Eurostat, supra note 32, at 100.
31 See Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, at T2.2 (1998).
3 'Kindorientierte Eheschliessung', see R. Nave-Herz. Familiale Verinderungen seit 1950. 4
Zeitschrift f[r Sozialisationsforschung und Erziehungswissenschaft 45-63 (1984).
31 See F. Rothenbacher, Social Change in Europe and its Impact on Family Structures, in J.
Eekelaar, T. Nhlapo (Eds.), The Changing Family 3, at 5 (1998).
38 Norway 48,6 per cent in 1997; Denmark 46,3 per cent in 1996; Iceland 65,2 per cent in 1997:
Council of Europe, supra note 35, at T 3.2.
39 Rothenbacher uses the term "the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous" to describe this
phenomenon; Rothenbacher, supra note 37, at 21.
40 See F. Hopflinger, Haushalts- und Familienstrukturen im intereuropdiischen Vergleich, in S.
Hradil, S. Immerfall (Eds.). Die westeuropdiischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich 97-138 (1997).
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been] resolved."'" International Conventions, such as the European Convention
on Human Rights42 and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, have
contributed a lot in settling central questions.43
Converging tendencies can be found in the substantive law of divorce. In
almost all countries marital breakdown is if not the only, at least the central
ground for divorce, and notions of fault have been largely banned.44 Even the
consequences of divorce in most parts of Europe no longer depend upon fault.
45
Discrimination against illegitimate children has been abolished in most
countries.4 6 Formal equality between the spouses has also been implemented.47
There is widespread consensus that the person who renders the homemaker's
services and therefore refrains from gainful employment has a right to partici-
pate in the wealth accumulated during marriage, including pensions.48 The last
few years even show a converging tendency to provide a legal institution for
same-sex partners.49
But all these are mere tendencies, and it would be premature to think that
one can build uniform rules on these tendencies.
41 D. Martiny, Is Unification of Family Law Feasible or Even Desirable?, in A. Hartkamp et al.
(Eds.). Towards a European Civil Code 151, at 164 (1998).
42 The latest example for the impact of the ECHR are the judgements of the European Court of
Human Rights in the cases Goodwin v. UK and .v. UK (11 July 2002) introducing the right of
transsexuals to marry. The judgement of Marlc v. Belgium (13 June 1979) had a comparable
impact concerning the equality of children born out of wedlock with children born to married
parents, see W. Pintens & K. Vanwinckelen, Casebook European Family Law 16 et seq. (2001).
43 See P. Vlaardingerbroek, Trends in the Development of Family Law in Europe Comparative
Perspectives, in F.-X. Kaufmann et al. (Eds.), Family Life and Family Policies in Europe, Vol. 2,
120 et seq. (2002).; C. McGlynn, The Europeanisation of Family Law, 13 Child and Family Law
Quarterly 35-49 (2001); M. Killerby. The Council of Europe's Contribution to Family Law (Past,
Present and Future), in N. Lowe, G. Douglas (Eds.), Families Across Frontiers 13-25 (1996).
44 In some countries fault remains a ground for divorce among others, most importantly France
(Art. 242 CC, Art. 243 CC). Belgium (Art. 229 CC. Art. 231 CC), Austria (§49 Ehegesetz).
England (Sec. 1 (2) (a)-(c) MCA 1973).
45 An exception is Belgium, where fault excludes the right to maintenance after divorce (Art. 301
§ 1 CC).
46 In the Netherlands and Belgium, the Alfarckx-case (13 June 1979, ECHR (1979) Series A,
No. 31) has given an important impulse to the reform in favour of illegitimate children; see W.
Pintens, K. Vanwinckelen, Casebook European Family Law 18 et seq. (2001).
41 See D. Henrich & D. Schwab (Eds.), Eheliche Gemeinschaft, Partnerschaft und Vermogen im
europdiischen Vergleich (1999).
48 See D. Henrich, I'erm6gensregelung bei Trennung und Scheidung im europiischen flergleich,
2000 Zeitschrift ftr das gesamte Familienrecht 6 et seq.
49 See M. Coester, Same-Sex Relationships: A Comparative Assessment of Legal Developments
Across Europe, 2002 Die Praxis des Familienrechts (FamPra.ch) 748-764; D. Jakob. Die
eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft im Europarecht, 2002 Zeitschrift ftir das gesamte
Familienrecht 501-508; see also the contributions in 3 European Journal of Law Reform (2001),
Special Issue on Family Law.
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F. Different Codification Techniques
The differences between the legal systems are already present when it comes to
codification techniques. Due to historical developments, we find significant
differences between the common law and the continental legal systems.
In the common law tradition, there are fewer rules for relationships in intact
family. Instead the law focuses on conflict situations.50 In contrast, the
continental systems tend to set up abstract rights and duties for intact family,51
although it is perfectly clear for continental lawyers, too, that they come into
play only when the personal relationship is no longer functioning. The
differences in practice are, accordingly, not as big as they may initially seem.
Another salient characteristic of common law statutes is their use of legal
definitions,5 2 something unknown to continental statutes. When developing
uniform rules that are to be applied by persons from different legal backgrounds
who may associate different meanings to a term, such legal definitions might
prove extremely helpful.
Let me call your attention to a third point on which national family law
statutes differ considerably. It is the amount of discretion given to the courts.
Take the financial consequences of divorce, for example, one of the central
concerns of contemporary divorce law. As I already mentioned, according to
English law the court may make financial orders, having regard to a number of
factors, which permits case-by-case analysis. The leading cases of White v.
White,53 Cowan v. Cowan54 and Lambert v. Lambert55 have produced some long
awaited guidelines 56 but a great deal of discretion is still left to the courts. 57 A
rather similar situation can be found in the Scandinavian countries. 58 Once
again, however, the continental legal systems show a different picture. As far as
matrimonial property regimes are concerned, they all employ hard and fast
rules, 59 defining exactly what goods have to be taken into account, at what time
50 K. Scheiwe, Kinderkosten und Sorgearbeit im Recht 330 (1999).
51 Examples are norms concerning the duties of the spouses: Netherlands: Art. 81 and 83 para. I
BW; France: Art. 212 and Art. 215 para. I CC; Sweden: Chapter 1, §2 Marriage Act; Belgium:
Art. 213 CC.
52 See e.g. England: sec. 3 (meaning of 'parental responsibility' ), sec. 8 (definition of residence,
contact and other orders with respect for children) Children Act 1989.
53 [2001] 1 All ER 1. [2000] 2 FLR 981.
51 [2001] EWCA Civ 679, [2001] 2 FLR 192.
55 [2002] EWCA Civ 1685, [2003] 1 FLR 139.
51 See J. Eekelaar. The Politics of Pragmatism: Family Law Reform in England and Wales, 3
European Journal of Law Reform 297, at 304 (2001); D. Hodson, M. Green, N. de Souza,
Lambert Shutting Pandora's Box, 2003 Fain Law 37-45.
57 See also J. Dewar, Reducing Discretion in Family Law, in J. Eekelaar, T. Nhlapo (Eds.), The
Changing Family. Family Forms & Family Law 231-250 (1998).
58 The Scandinavian laws contain rules to avoid 'unreasonable results' in the application of the
principle of equal division of property. see A. Agell, Is there One System of Family Law in the
Nordic Countries?, 3 European Journal of Law Reform 313, at 327 (2001).
51 See D. Henrich, Verm6gensregelung bei Trennung und Scheidung im europdiischen Vergleich,
2000 Zeitschrift far das gesamte Familienrecht 6-12. A. Agell, The Division of Property Upon
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the respective properties have to be evaluated, and what the share of each
spouse will be. As to spousal support, although many continental legislators
also defer to the discretion of the court,6 ° there are other approaches as well.
Take, for example, German law. In the German Civil Code seven provisions
regulate in detail when support is to be ordered by the court.61 In practice so-
called maintenance guidelines 62 are issued by the appellate courts that specify
the amount of support due in a given case down to Euro and Cent.
Which of the two paths should a uniform or harmonised law follow when it
comes to the financial consequences of divorce? Blanket clauses that give much
leeway to judges might receive wide approval. But that is at the same time their
biggest shortcoming. As blanket clauses permit broad differences in interpreta-
tion, nothing would have to change, and every national court could go on
adjudicating much as under its prior national rule.63 There is yet another strong
argument against blanket clauses for financial matters: in the bargaining context
they work against the economically weaker party, who settles for less than
under hard and fast rules.64 This is why the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution 61 worked out by the American Law Institute and published recently
now expressly define what marital property is,66 what share each spouse will
get67 and how post-divorce spousal support is to be calculated. 68 The Principles
even recommend the employment of mathematical formula for some of these
purposes.69
Divorce From a European Perspective, in J. Pousson-Petit (Ed.), Droit compar6 des personnes et
de la famille Liber amicorum Marie-Therese Meulders-Klein 1-20 (1998); see also the
contributions in D. Henrich & D. Schwab (Eds.), Eheliche Gemeinschaft, Partnerschaft und
Vermogen im europdiischen Vergleich (1999).
60 See France: Art. 272 CC; Switzerland: Art. 125 CC.
61 §1570-1576 BGB.
62 Most influential are the DUsseldorf guidelines (Diisseldorfer Tabelle), the version of 1 January
2002 is published in 2001 Zeitschrift f'ir das gesamte Familienrecht 810et seq. or on
www.famrz.de.
63 See concerning contract law H. Kbtz, Alte und neue Azqgaben der Rechtsvergleichung, 57
Juristen Zeitung 257. at 259 (2002).64 K. Scheiwe, Kinderkosten und Sorgearbeit im Recht 365 (1999); R.H. Mnookin, L.
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale Law Journal
950, at 977 etseq. (1979).
65 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations 2002 (hereinafter ALl Principles).
66 §4.03-4.08 ALl Principles.
67 §4.09-4.12 ALl Principles.
68 Chapter 5 ALI Principles.
69 E.g. §5.04 ALl Principles recommends to establish a rule that applies "a specified percentage to
the difference between the incomes the spouses are expected to have after dissolution.". This
percentage is called the durational factor because it increases with the marriage's duration, see
ALI Principles, 816 et seq.
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G. Divergences Due to Different Structures of
Administration of Justice and the Law of Procedure
Major differences between legal systems exist regarding the structures of
administration of justice."0 This may have a strong effect on substantive law.
Thus, for example, the level of protection afforded to the weaker party by a
requirement that a marriage contract be notarised depends upon the relevant law
for notaries. Are notaries members of the legal profession or not; are they
obliged to counsel the parties or do they simply authenticate the signatures on a
written agreement? The effectiveness of the law of child protection also differs
according to whether youth authorities are filled by professionals or lay-
persons.71 Likewise it is highly important whether a country provides for family
courts7" and a specialised bar73 or whether judges may even be laypersons74 and
whether legal counsel is provided and required in family law matters.75 Finally
the level and the frequency of mediation, as well as the professions of persons
who practise it,76 influence family law in action.
H. Divergences Due to Different Family Policies and
Family Realities
Having reached this stage of analysis, we can tackle the substantially differing
solutions among several national legal systems. How do we react, for example,
once we discover that in one country parents owe support to their adult children
who are still students, but in another country support obligations are due only
for minor children? The explanation for this limitation can possibly be found in
publicly funded scholarships that young adults can benefit from. Yet another
example: if a legal system does not at all provide pension sharing at divorce,
this need not mean, that women are left without means for their old age. It may
instead be that women in that country do not need pension splitting or other
o See the contributions in M.-T. Meulders-Klein (Ed.), Families & Justice (1997).
71 Switzerland for example knows a system of local child protection authorities with high lay
participation, whereas France has a system of professional juge des mineurs'.
72 Examples are the specialised family courts in Germany, Portugal or Spain, see e.g. D. Schwab,
Le droit de la famille et la justice en Allemagne, in M.-T. Meulders-Klein (Ed.), Families &
Justice 105. at 108 (1997); M.A. de Sousa, Portugal. in C. Hamilton, A. Perry (Eds.), Family Law
in Europe 521, at 523 (2002); E. Roca, Spain, in id., 587, at 590.
73 See J. Eekelaar, M. Maclean, S. Beinart, Family Lawyers. The Divorce Work of Solicitors
(2000).
7' An example is the family proceedings court in England and Wales, see C. Hamilton, England
& Wales, in C. Hamilton, A. Perry (Eds.), Family Law in Europe 97 (2002).
7' E.g. §78 of the German Law on civil procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) states a requirement to
be represented by a lawyer in divorce and related matters before the family courts.
76 See Conseil de I' Europe, La mediation familiale en Europe: actes, 4e Confdrence europdenne
sur le droit de la famille, ler-2 octobre 1998 (2000).
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financial provisions because they have very high employment rates accompa-
nied by public care for children and/or state guaranteed income.77 Or it is even
conceivable that kinship relations and family networks still function so well that
women are not left in poverty.
This leads us to differences in family realities. When it comes to joint cus-
tody for children after divorce established as a rule, it makes a big difference
whether fathers take a truly active role in children and family work during the
ongoing family 79 - as it seems to be more and more the case in Scandinavia -
or not, as in Southern Europe, where patriarchal patterns still dominate.8 '
As these examples demonstrate, to get an overall picture of working family
law is possible only if we include research on other areas of law that are ele-
ments of national family policies such as social law, labour law and tax law.
European countries encompass a wide variety of family policies, ranging from
Sweden that supports families with the declared aim of reaching gender equal-
ity, to Switzerland that defines family as a private matter without need of public
support.8 2 Having this in mind, it is more or less a question of technicalities how
to reconcile the different areas of law concerned. Likewise, before we start har-
monising or even unifying family law, we need insights from sociology of law,
family sociology and psychology. 83 Indeed, this interdisciplinary exchange is
indispensable.
7' This is the case in Scandinavia, see A. Leira, The Modernisation of Motherhood, in E. Drew,
R. Emerek, E. Mahon (Eds.), Women, Work and the Family in Europe 159, at 168 (1998).
78 This is the case in Southern Europe, see L. Flaquer, Is there a Southern European Model of
Family Policy? in A. Pfenning, T. Bahle (Eds.), Families and Family Policies in Europe 15-33
(2000).
79 As to the beneficial effects of fathers' participation in family work see e.g. A. Herlth, The New
Fathers: What Does it Mean for Children, Marriage and for Family Policy?, in F.-X. Kaufmann
et al. (Eds.), Family Life and Family Policies in Europe, Vol. 2, 299-322 (2002).
80 See U. Bjrnberg, Family Orientation Among Men, in E. Drew, R. Emerek, E. Mahon (Eds.),
Women, Work and the Family in Europe 200-207 (1998).
81 See D. Giovannini, Are Fathers Changing?, in E. Drew, R. Emerek, E. Mahon (Eds.), Women,
Work and the Family in Europe 191-199 (1998).
82 See e.g. F.-X. Kaufmann, Politics and Policies Towards the Family in Europe: A Framework
and an Inquiry into their Differences and Convergences, in F.-X. Kaufmann et al. (Eds.), Family
Life and Family Policies in Europe. Vol. 2, 419-490 (2002): A. Pfenning. T. Bahle (Eds.),
Families and Family Policies in Europe (2000); J. Commaille, F. de Singly (Eds.), The European
Family (1997); Fux distinguishes the following family policy regimes: the etatistic family policy
aims at supporting gender equality and providing benefits for a variety of living arrangements
(e.g. Sweden). The familialistic family policy aims at balancing the income situation between
parents and stimulating reproductive behaviour (e.g. France). The individualistic family policy
defines family as a private matter (e.g. Switzerland); see B. Fux, Which Models of the Family are
Encouraged or Discouraged by Different Family Policies? in F.-X. Kaufmann et al. (Eds.),
Family Life and Family Policies in Europe, Vol. 2, 363, at 385 et seq. (2002).
83 See already 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law. 37 Modern Law
Review 1, at 27 (1974), quoted in D. Bradley, Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants
and Political Economy, 6 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 127, at 129
(1999).
Ingeborg Schwenzer
I. Divergences Due to Different Value Systems
Finally, most of the divergences in national family laws and family policy can
only be attributed to different value systems.8 4 Why does one country rely upon
post-divorce and kinship support duties, for example, while another provides
public support?8" Why are there still so many countries that do not provide
adequate rules for the breakdown of non-marital unions? 86 Why are there still
differences in parentage law for children born within and outside of wedlock?87
Why are premarital agreements scrutinised by courts in one country, but not in
others?88 I could go on putting such questions endlessly.
Certainly all depends on the relevant value system. But what are the crucial
issues that determine so many outcomes in family law as well as in the
surrounding areas linked to family policy?
In my opinion three basic points determine the orientation of all national
family laws: the importance of marriage as a basis of family law, gender issues,
and the conceptual dualism of private and public spheres.
The first central question is whether and if so to what extent family law is
still firmly based on marriage. Many rules can only be explained as attempts to
protect the institution of marriage despite the contrary needs of parties who are
involved.89 In this context, form is often more important than substance. Surely,
there has been a constant process of deinstitutionalisation of family relation-
ships in all countries during recent decades,9" fuelled in part by the ever-
growing importance of human rights. But major differences between countries
still exist.
The second crucial issue is the gender aspect of family law. It is true that all
norms directly discriminating against women have been banned from family
law statutes. 9' Thus formal equal rights have been widely achieved. The
remaining task is to track down subtle cases of indirect discrimination and
84 See M. Antokolskaia, Family Values and Harmonisation of Family Law, in M. Maclean (Ed.),
Family Law and Family Values (forthcoming).
85 The latter is especially the case in Scandinavia, see D. Bradley, Family Law and Political
Culture 259 (1996).
86 See J. Rubellin-Devichi, Des concubinages dans le monde (1990).
87 Differences especially concern the establishment and contestation of paternity, see 1.
Schwenzer, Empfiehlt es sich, das Kindschaftsrecht neu zu regeln?, Gutachten fUr den 59.
Deutschen Juristentag Hannover 1992, at 21 et seq. (1992).
88 See 1. Schwenzer, Richterliche Kontrolle von Unterhaltsvereinbarungen zwischen Ehegatten, 6
Zeitschrift f'ir Europdiisches Privatrecht 863-873 (1997).
'9 Examples are the still existing differences in parentage law between children born within and
outside of wedlock or the spouses' obligation to choose a common family name.
90 See H. Willekens, Long-term Developments in Family Law in Western Europe: an Explanation,
in J. Eekelaar, T. Nhlapo (Eds.), The Changing Family 47, at 55 et seq. (1998).
91 For the history of gender inequality in family law see e.g. B. Dolemeyer, Frau und Familie im
Privatrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts, in U. Gerhard (Ed.), Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts 633 et
seq. (1997).
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achieve substantially equal opportunities, taking into account existing social
inequalities.92 Sensitivity to this goal still differs greatly among countries.93
The third key question is closely linked to the first and the second: it centres
on the conceptual dualism of private and public spheres. Are the tasks of
bringing up children and caring for those who are not able to earn their own
living by gainful employment private in nature? Or are enabling and motivating
women to re-enter the workforce (by providing day care and the like) or
encouraging men to engage in childrearing by granting generous father's leave
public tasks?94 Is the exclusion of all financial adjustments upon divorce in a
premarital contract or a separation agreement a private affair? 95 How about
domestic violence in the ongoing relationship?
All these examples demonstrate that deinstitutionalisation of family relation-
ships and growing awareness of gender issues in family law go hand in hand
with the family moving more and more to the public sphere. The aim of family
law, in my opinion, is on the one hand not to hinder people in their quest for
individually satisfying family structures and, on the other hand, to protect the
interests of the vulnerable when individuals fail in that quest.
J. Conclusion
Let me come to a close. I have taken you on the mental journey that I believe
must undergrid the unifying process in family law. I have had to omit very
important questions, such as, what kind of instrument are we aiming at - a
convention, a directive, a model law, principles or guidelines? But I did so
deliberately. Because I think the utmost importance has to be given to the
process of unification itself First, we must employ the well-known comparative
law approach; next, we need to undertake an interdisciplinary discussion; and,
finally, we have to sit together and resolve important values issues. Only then
can we start drafting. The challenges entail quite a few methodological
problems - but I am convinced that we can shoulder them.
92 See N. Dethloff, Reform of German Family Law a Battle against Discrimination, 3 European
Journal of Law Reform 221-241 (2001); K. Scheiwe, Kinderkosten und Sorgearbeit im Recht
(1999), especially at 327 et seq.
93 See J. Ktinzler, Paths Towards a Modernization of Gender Relations, Policies and Family
Building, in F.-X. Kaufmann et al. (Eds.), Family Life and Family Policies in Europe, Vol. 2,
252-298 (2002).
9' Basedow underlines the link between the equality of women and men in the workplace
according to European Community law and equality in family law, see J. Basedow,
Konstantinidis v. Bangemann oder die Familie im Europdischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2
Zeitschrift fWr Europdiisches Privatrecht 197-199 (1994).
95 See the important decision of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG, I BvR 12/92 of
6.2.2001. 31 (see www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de).
